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Summary: Emerging markets in the last decade increased the stock of foreign
reserves and simultaneously managed to raise GDP growth while leaving short
term foreign debt and investment in net fixed capital nearly unchanged. This
work builds a model able to derive these facts as the result of greater openness 
to global goods and financial markets. Emerging countries generate the ob-
served high ratios of reserves to short term foreign debt to hedge against vola-
tility of foreign capital inflow with the purpose of stabilising not the short term 
but the long term finance available to domestic firms. Numerical simulations of
the model derive the rising level of reserves to short term foreign debt ratio and
about half of the observed rise in GDP growth as a result of a falling cost of 
long term finance and the increasing competitiveness of domestic industry. 
Key words: Foreign reserves, Short term foreign debt, Long term finance, 
Growth, Investment. 
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This study proposes a new approach to explaining why emerging countries, espe-
cially those that exhibit high GDP growth rates, are responsible for massive accumu-
lation of foreign reserves. 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, economists and international institu-
tions argued that the stock of international reserves, in the absence of an international 
lender of last resort, is warranted as insurance against foreign short term debt with-
drawal (Guillermo Calvo 1998; Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs 1998; Martin 
Feldstein 1999). Both the Federal Reserve and the IMF, since then, have recom-
mended that countries follow the so called Greenspan-Guidotti rule of thumb, ac-
cording to which an adequate level of reserves should be equal to the stock of the 
short term external debt (Alan Greenspan 1999; Stanley Fisher 2001). Several recent 
studies, however, have reported that the average demand for international reserves 
from emerging economies, which was comparable to developed countries in the 80s, 
has climbed since the 90s to reach levels never seen before, well above the coverage 
ratio recommended by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule.  
With the exception of Michael B. Devereux and Alan Sutherland (2009), who 
argue that holding fixed income nominal bonds and issuing claims on capital (FDI) 
achieves a considerable degree of international risk-sharing, the prevalent opinion in 
the literature is that the observed stocks of reserves are not optimally determined. 
Richardo J. Caballero and Stavros Panageas (2004, 2005) suggest that holding state 
contingent assets in a Central Bank’s portfolio would be a more efficient self insur- 
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ing policy. Bruce Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2010) claim that the increasing 
reserve hoarding is responsible for global imbalances (as savings from emerging 
economies could be better employed to finance domestic and global growth instead 
of the US current account deficit). Oliver Jeanne (2007) points out that emerging 
countries less exposed to the risks of the capital account crisis are those that accumu-
late more reserves. The evidence summarised in Section 1 of this study, however, 
draws attention to some stylised facts suggesting that the extent of reserves, rather 
than being suboptimal, is still partially unexplained. Emerging countries in the last 
decade seem to have reduced their exposure to the risk of short term foreign capital 
outflow: BRIC countries, which are the biggest and fastest growing economies, have 
managed to almost double their average growth rates with little growth in new capital 
assets and short term foreign debt; similarly, smaller emerging economies have even 
managed to increase growth despite a lower level of investment in new capital assets 
and a lower short term foreign debt. Nevertheless, emerging countries - especially 
those growing more - have kept raising foreign reserves massively. 
This work builds a model that is able to derive both the high GDP growth and 
the growing stock of reserves as the result of the same process of the globalisation of 
the emerging economies. 
The rise in the demand for international reserves has stimulated a resurgence 
of the literature on reserves adequacy. Earlier models on reserves adequacy date back 
to the1960s and 1970s and are surveyed in Robert Flood and Nancy P. Marion 
(2002). A mercantilist view, advanced by  Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-
Landau, and Peter Garber (2003), suggests that the accumulation of reserves in an 
emerging economy is the consequence of promoting export-led growth by maintain-
ing a large and persistent current account surplus with an undervalued currency. 
However, as Joshua Aizenman and Jaewoo Lee (2007) argue, this approach could 
hardly explain why reserve accumulation grew in the last decade, while the export 
led growth in East Asia has been a well established strategy for the last 50 years. 
Moreover, the increasing reserve accumulation is carried out even in countries that 
have not adopted specific export-led policies and that have been using accumulated 
reserves to carry out countercyclical policies (André M. Cunha et al. 2011). An alter-
native approach, labelled the precautionary (or self-insurance) view, relates the in-
creasing reserves to the recent financial liberalisation. This work is a further contri-
bution to this line of research. Recent empirical studies on the effects of financial 
crises on output losses are Michael Hutchison and Ilan Noy (2006), Michael D. Bor-
do, Christopher M. Meissner, and David Stuckler (2010). The studies of Dietrich 
Domanski, Ingo Fender, and Patrick McGuire (2011) and Phillip A. O’Hara (2011) 
focus on global money and financial architecture in the light of the last financial and 
economic crisis. 
Theoretical models explaining the stockpile of foreign reserves, using the ap-
proach of the precautionary view, often describe emerging countries as financing 
long term investment with volatile short term foreign capital and building reserves to 
cushion the real output of the economy in the event of foreign capital outflow. The 
impact of a sudden stop (of foreign capital inflow) on the output varies from one 
model to another. For example, in Jeanne and Romain Rancière (2006) and in Jeanne  
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(2007) the sudden stop lasts one period, after which the output goes back to its long 
run growth path, whereas in Pablo Garcia and Claudio Soto (2004), in Aizenman and 
Lee (2007) and in Yin-Wong Cheung and Xingwang Qian (2009) the sudden stop 
forces a costly liquidation of the investment, thereby reducing the output. Other theo-
retical studies focus on the effect of capital outflows on the real exchange rate (Avner 
Bar-Ilan and Marion 2009) take the target of reserves as given and neglect the finan-
cial account of the balance of payments; Timothly Kehoe and Kim J. Ruhl (2009) do 
not focus on the precautionary role of foreign bond holdings) and on the determina-
tion of capital outflows as solutions of a general equilibrium framework (Laura Alfa-
ro and Fabio Kanczuk 2009; Devereux and Sutherland 2009). 
This study derives the reserves to short term foreign debt ratio as an optimal 
choice of a Central Bank which acts in the interest of a representative firm. The firm, 
in turn, simultaneously chooses investment and long term finance, in a setting where 
renewal of foreign short term debt is subject to uncertainty. Short term finance, 
which depends on foreign capital inflow and domestic monetary policy, is volatile 
but cheaper, whereas long term private finance is more costly and the cost increases 
with quantity. The outcome of the model is that the firm maximising its expected 
profit is not concerned with hedging against short term finance fluctuations, but it is 
rather concerned with hedging against the risk of rising long term costly finance in 
connection with its investment opportunity. As a consequence, from the viewpoint of 
the Central Bank, building a stock of reserves equal to the short term foreign debt (as 
the Greenspan-Guidotti rule would imply) is not sufficient. Optimal hedging policies 
imply higher ratios.  
An approximated analytical solution of the model is derived to carry out a 
thorough sensitivity analysis of the determinants of the optimal reserves to short term 
foreign debt ratio and of its effects on the investment and financial structure. The 
optimal solution depends crucially on two structural parameters newly introduced in 
this model and representative of the openness of the emerging countries to global 
markets: they account for the marginal cost of long term finance and for the competi-
tiveness of the domestic industry. Numerical simulations of the model reproduce the 
rising level of reserves in connection with rising GDP growth and rising long term 
finance as a result of simultaneous changes in both aforementioned openness pa-
rameters and derive almost half of the observed rise in GDP growth during the dec-
ade 2000-09 as a pure effect of the decreasing cost of long term finance. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1, stylised facts 
are inferred from a descriptive analysis of the emerging countries. In Section 2, the 
model is presented and its approximated analytical solution is derived. Section 3 
comments on the properties of the optimal solution for reserves to short term foreign 
debt ratio and its effects on investment and long term finance and derives numerical 
solutions compatible with observed stylised facts. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Evolution of Emerging Countries over Time 
 
The empirical descriptive analysis of this section is based on a sample of 18 emerg-
ing countries distributed across Asia, Latin America and Africa from 1990 to 2009. 
The sample is split into two subsamples: the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India  
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and China), which in the last decade account for more than 60% of the sample’s 
GDP, and the other 14 smaller economies (less than 40% of the sample’s GDP). Due 
to policy coordination, South Africa nowadays is often considered a new member of 
the group of strongest emerging (BRICS) economies. In this paper, however, it is 
considered more homogeneous with the smaller emerging countries as its GDP ac-
counts for about 2.6% of the sample.  
Figures in this section report the evolution of variables for the weighted aver-
age of the two subsamples and the full sample. 
 
 
Source: World Bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 1  Reserves to Short Term Foreign Debt Ratio  
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the ratio of reserves to short term foreign debt climbed 
from around 1 in 1990 to around 7.5 in 2009. The increasing level of this ratio was 
particularly pronounced in the group of bigger economies. Figure 2 indicates that the 
rise in the reserves to short term foreign debt ratio is associated to the increasing de-
mand for international reserves. This was around 5% of GDP in 1990 and rose con-
stantly to around 30% in 2009, with the exception of difficult years (2000, 2008), 
when reserves were partially reduced. By contrast, the full sample short term foreign 
debt (Figure 3) presents a relatively stable path between 4% and 5% of GDP, sug-
gesting that on average the rising values of the aforementioned reserves to short term 
ratio can be explained more by the increasing demand for foreign reserves than by 
the decreasing level of the short term foreign debt. Deleveraging contributed more 
intensively to raising the ratio in the smaller economies during the four years follow-
ing the Asian Crisis. 
The stylised fact that the demand for reserves continued to increase even dur-
ing periods when the short term foreign debt decreased suggests that the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule is not perceived as a sufficient recommendation to prevent new crises 
and that the short term foreign debt is not the only variable to take into account when 
the foreign reserve policy is decided. 
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Source: World Bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 2  Foreign Reserves to GDP (Percent Values) 
 
 
Source: World bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 3  Short Term Debt to GDP (Percent Values) 
 
The precautionary view emphasises that short term foreign debt is used up by 
emerging countries to finance long term investment projects (Roberto Chang and 
Andres Velasco 2001; Jeanne and Rancière 2006; Aizenman and Lee 2007; Jeanne 
2007). Assessing the overall effect of short term foreign debt on the level of invest-
ment is a difficult task. In our sample, merely comparing the average values in the 
years 1990-99 and 2000-09, reported in Table 1, both the net investment (defined as 
gross fixed capital formation less depreciation) and the short term foreign debt de-
creased in the smaller economies and increased for the BRIC countries. From a 
closer look at the trends, it can be observed that the ratio of short term foreign debt to 
net investment (Figure 4) after 2000 was stable in BRIC economies and fell in the 
smaller countries. 
While the short term foreign debt seems to play a diminishing role, the rele-
vance of other sources of longer term finance (foreign and domestic) is clearly in-
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creasing. Table 1 reports the average values of three sources: foreign debt with ma-
turity over one year, international flows in the capital market (to finance bonds and 
new equity issues) and the volume of the stock traded. A proxy for long term finance 
(LTF) is built on the reported sources of finance, based on the simplifying assump-
tion that the ratio between short and long term finance in the capital market is the 
same as for the foreign debt. LTF proxy to GDP over time (Figure 5) was considera-
bly higher in the group of smaller economies until 2006 (except for the year 2000), 
and was quite volatile in the BRIC group, where it rose by 87% on average in the 
second decade (Table 1). 
 
Table 1   Evolution of Emerging Economies: Growth, Investment, Short Term Debt and Reserves 
 
1990-99 2y  growth
NI/
GDP
STD/
GDP
RES/
GDP
RES/
STD
LTD/
GDP
IKM/
GDP
ST/
GDP
LTF/
GDP
All ECs (av.)  8.36 13.56 7.31 11.62 1.59 35.51 1.93 16.72 49.93
All ECs (w. av.)  9.26 13.60 5.67 8.41 1.484 25.69 1.73 15.13 39.50
BRIC 9.23 14.11 3.09 6.87 2.226 20.66 0.94 14.53 34.12
Smaller ECs  9.10 12.99 8.81 10.23 1.161 33.51 2.70 16.46 48.68
Argentina 9.41 5.59 7.66 6.48 0.846 28.87 3.33 3.90 34.59
Brazil 5.11 7.00 5.17 5.55 1.075 23.01 1.17 12.20 33.92
Chile 13.43 10.73 7.15 21.57 3.018 34.43 2.70 7.83 43.15
China 22.44 22.92 2.77 11.41 4.113 13.29 1.00 18.86 29.72
Colombia 5.32 8.19 5.34 11.60 2.172 28.72 1.75 1.26 31.26
Egypt, Arab Rep.  9.04 12.13 5.38 22.95 4.267 52.43 0.47 3.11 55.67
Indonesia 12.78 11.30 13.39 10.76 0.804 59.95 2.63 8.75 69.26
India 11.94 12.73 1.68 5.64 3.350 25.51 0.71 20.73 45.63
Morocco 4.45 25.96 2.66 12.62 4.744 70.59 0.68 2.66 73.81
Mexico 6.74 12.41 7.83 5.59 0.714 28.46 3.43 11.57 40.23
Malaysia 14.56 7.77 8.68 30.83 3.552 33.33 3.43 99.69 115.14
Pakistan 7.90 26.78 5.37 3.46 0.643 42.69 1.23 9.49 52.21
Peru 8.66 8.66 13.53 14.33 1.059 43.39 0.69 4.39 47.26
Philippines 6.35 11.89 9.55 11.82 1.238 54.60 3.39 16.44 71.48
Russian Federation  -8.13 10.84 2.78 2.79 1.004 26.94 1.02 1.71 29.42
Thailand 9.18 9.20 19.72 21.16 1.073 35.88 2.81 37.48 61.88
Turkey 7.53 30.05 8.48 7.10 0.837 31.29 2.77 18.39 47.94
South Africa  3.80 9.91 4.36 3.04 0.696 5.84 1.53 19.99 18.17
 
2000-09 2y  growth
NI/
GDP
STD/
GDP
RES/
GDP
RES/
STD
LTD/
GDP
IKM/
GDP
ST/
GDP
LTF/
GDP
All ECs (av.)  11.31 11.7 5.26 19.22 3.657 29.89 2.79 31.76 56.79
All ECs(w. av.)  14.15 16.39 4.57 20.64 4.516 20.66 2.51 47.07 61.25
BRIC 16.63 19.22 4.07 24.04 5.912 15.06 2.24 59.73 63.85
Smaller ECs  10.15 12.16 5.26 14.62 2.779 29.44 2.88 24.71 52.84
Argentina 8.29 7.38 11.85 12.61 1.065 55.36 1.39 3.30 59.22
Brazil 7.06 5.59 3.50 9.02 2.574 24.05 3.36 23.15 47.19
Chile 8.04 8.85 8.03 16.87 2.100 37.73 4.29 14.68 53.37
China 22.01 28.68 4.90 32.26 6.588 6.77 1.23 79.36 53.53
Colombia 8.43 8.20 3.17 10.36 3.267 25.55 2.37 2.99 30.32
Egypt, Arab Rep.  9.98 12.12 2.15 19.37 9.004 27.27 2.25 21.31 49.10
Indonesia 32.30 8.74 6.82 14.06 2.063 41.91 1.73 13.56 55.05
India 14.98 18.11 1.77 16.95 9.599 16.63 1.64 68.04 79.62
Morocco 10.05 19.03 2.63 26.35 10.012 32.11 0.58 13.08 44.73
Mexico 4.29 17.06 1.87 8.34 4.467 20.21 2.80 7.21 29.38
Malaysia 10.10 9.00 8.95 44.00 4.918 30.76 6.04 44.19 69.67
Pakistan 9.69 13.93 1.42 9.11 6.407 32.69 0.57 59.83 90.58
Peru 11.29 6.84 4.57 19.72 4.315 33.83 1.89 2.97 38.11
Philippines 9.58 9.71 5.88 21.48 3.654 55.35 6.49 8.47 68.87
Russian Federation  12.30 7.64 4.80 22.87 4.767 30.85 4.57 28.67 59.61
Thailand 8.96 6.70 9.37 33.68 3.596 24.89 1.38 45.98 59.31
Turkey 8.37 16.31 7.36 10.93 1.485 31.56 3.60 41.14 67.84
South Africa  7.97 6.81 5.56 8.68 1.561 10.60 3.99 93.82 74.77
 
Note: Average values of 2 years GDP growth (2y growth), net (start up) investment in fixed capital assets over GDP 
(NI/GDP), stock of short term foreign debt over GDP (STD/GDP), stock of foreign reserves over GDP (RES/GDP), reserves  
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to short term foreign debt ratio (RES/STD), stock of long term foreign debt with maturity higher than one year over GDP 
(LTD/GDP), financing via international capital market over GDP (IKM/GDP), stock traded over GDP (ST/GDP), proxy for 
long term finance to GDP (LTF/GDP). NI is defined as gross fixed capital formation less depreciation; LTF/GDP is compu-
ting by summing all sources of finance (STD+LTD+IKM+ST) and multiplying by the ratio of long term over total foreign debt. 
Values refer to two different time periods (1990-99 and 2000-09) for each single country of the sample and for the following 
groups: Full sample (average and weighted average values), BRIC economies (weighted average values) and smaller 
economies (weighted average values). 
Source: World Bank dataset. Author’s calculation. 
 
 
Source: World Bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 4  Short-Term Foreign Debt to Net Investment (Percent Values) 
 
 
Source: World Bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 5  Long Term Finance to GDP (Percent Value) 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how the long term GDP growth (average over 2 years) in-
creased sharply for 5 years from 2002 to 2007, to an extent that the growth in the net 
investment is not able to explain. The average values reported in Table 1 confirm this 
result: 2 year growth rates increased by 80% in the BRIC countries while the net in-
vestment increased by less than 4%, and increased in the smaller countries even 
though the net investment decreased. 
Overall, the empirical descriptive analysis of this section allows us to establish 
the following stylised facts: firstly, the stock of reserves grows independently from 
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short term foreign debt; secondly, there is no clear relation between short term for-
eign debt and investment in new capital assets; thirdly, countries have been able to 
grow considerably in the last decade even though investment in new capital assets 
has not changed to a relevant extent; fourthly, massive reserves accumulation, rather 
than causing underinvestment and slowing down the economy, seems to have grown, 
as has GDP.  
 
Source: World Bank dataset. Author's calculation. 
 
Figure 6  Growth of GDP over 2 Years (Percent Values) 
 
While the evidence presented in this section seems to contrast with existing 
explanations of the rationale for (and consequence of) reserve accumulation, the next 
section finds a theoretical explanation which makes all the aforementioned stylised 
facts consistent with each other. 
 
2. Reserves, Investment and Finance 
 
This section builds a partial equilibrium theoretical model describing the optimal 
solutions for a representative firm, which determines the supply of goods, and a Cen-
tral Bank, which determines the optimal stock of foreign reserves, in a setting where 
renewal of foreign short term debt is subject to uncertainty.  
The model describes a partial equilibrium in that it takes as given the demand 
for produced goods from both the domestic consumer and the foreign sector and does 
not consider the trade balance and the exchange rate. All variables are denominated 
in domestic currency. The assumption of constant exchange rate is not needed, as the 
quantities involved (foreign reserves, investment, long term finance, final output), 
determined as endogenous solutions, are able to capture price effects. In this respect, 
this study differs from most of the models belonging to the precautionary view, sur-
veyed in the introduction, which associate capital reversal to output drop while leav-
ing unchanged (Jeanne and Ranciere 2006; Jeanne 2007) or unspecified
1 the value of 
the other national quantities. 
                                                        
1 In Aizenman and Lee (2007), bank liabilities come from foreign saving only. Other models, such as 
Garcia and Soto (2004), Caballero and Panageas (2004, 2005), do not commit themselves to explicit 
relations between national aggregate quantities, and adopt generic variables to be measured empirically, 
such as “cost of a crisis” or “need for funds during the sudden stop.” 
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Subsection 2.1 derives a non closed form solution, subsection 2.2 an analytical 
approximated solution. The latter is used in Section 3 for a thorough sensitivity 
analysis and for carrying out the numerical simulations. 
 
2.1 Optimal Solutions for a Firm and a Central Bank 
 
For simplicity, we assume that all firms are identical and that population size is equal 
to 1. Therefore the model describes a single firm but all variables involved denote 
national aggregate quantities. As in previous studies on the role of reserves, we as-
sume that liquidity shock may force underinvestment, reducing second period output. 
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that domestic long term invest-
ment of the firm is financed by: (i) cash flow from preexisting assets; (ii) short term 
finance from banks; (iii) long term finance, from any sources (long term debt from 
banks, bonds, new equities, capital venture, etc.). Short term finance depends on two 
components: supply of foreign short term credit and supply of domestic credit. We 
assume that domestic credit is cheaper but scarce (for simplicity, interest rate is 
zero), whereas the cost of foreign short term credit is higher and constant ( >0 ). 
We also set the interest rate on foreign reserves as equal to zero, therefore   also 
represents the spread between the low yield on liquid reserve assets and the cost of 
external borrowing (Dean Baker and Karl Walentin 2001; Dani Rodrik 2006; Stiglitz 
2006). Demand for short term credit to finance the investment is perfectly elastic, as 
the long term finance is more expensive. We assume that raising long term finance is 
costly and the cost increases with the quantity. 
The time line is summarised in Table 2. Investment starts at time 0 with a new 
fixed (start up) capital factor,  , and is completed at time 1 with a variable compo-
nent,  . The variable investment   includes payment to all factors which are different 
from the initial fixed capital (intangible capital, human capital, workers, capital re-
placement, etc.). 
 
Table 2 The Time Line 
 
  Time 0 Time 1 Time 2
EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
Investment in net capital assets 
(K) raising funds from short term 
foreign debt (D0) and pre-existing 
sources (V). 
Shock to short term foreign capital 
(ε). 
 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
  Short term finance available (D1) 
determined by ε and h*. 
Return on output.
Service of finance.  
Net profit π. 
DECISIONS  Central bank’s reserves policy
h*. 
Firm’s variable investment and 
long term finance  
I*, B*. 
 
Source: Author’s model.  
 
Physical output is realised at time 2 and given by 
 
 ( , ) =       .  (1)
 
We adopt the conventional (but unnecessary) assumption of constant return to 
scale:  + =1 . For simplicity, we assume that at time 0 the only source of short  
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term finance is from foreigners, and the amount is given by   . Time 0’s start up 
capital is thus 
 
 =    + ,   (2)
 
where   is cash flow from preexisting assets. Time 1’s investment is financed with 
(domestic and foreign) short term finance,   , and long term finance,  : 
 
 =    +  .   (3)
 
At time 1, the firm has to service the previous period’s debt (principal and in-
terests) and renewal of foreign debt is hit by a multiplicative shock  , distributed as a 
normal  (1,  ); therefore, available funds from foreigners are given by   (  − 1 −
 ); the firm at time 1 also raises short term debt from domestic credit, Δ  . The lat-
ter is determined by the monetary policy. Recalling that change in money supply is 
the sum of changes in domestic credit and foreign reserves, i.e. Δ  = Δ   + Δ , we 
assume that the central bank at time 1 fulfills the following simple rules: 
1. Precautionary policy: the proportion of foreign reserves to private foreign 
short term capital inflow is constant (ℎ) if the net capital inflow is positive ( >0 ), 
zero otherwise; 
2. Sterilisation of foreign currency operations: if the net capital inflow is non 
negative at time 1, money supply is unchanged (Δ  = 0 if  ≥0 ); 
3. Expansionary policy during a crisis: if the net capital inflow is negative at 
time 1, new money is issued in proportion ℎ of the net capital outflow (Δ  = −ℎ    
if  <0 ).  
From the aforementioned rules, reserves at times 0 and 1 are given, respec-
tively, by 
 
   =ℎ      (4)
 
and 
 
   =  ℎ   i f   ≥ 0
0i f   < 0
 ,  (5)
 
whereas domestic credit at time 1 is given by 
 
Δ   = −ℎ  ( −1 ).  (6)
 
Summing up domestic and foreign credit yields the total short term finance 
available to the firm at time 1: 
 
   =   [ℎ+(1−ℎ ) −(1+  )].  (7)
 
At time 2 the output is sold at price   and revenues are given by  ( , ) =
  ( , ). We make the assumption that a negative relation (even very small) exists 
between time 2’s output price and time 1’s capital inflow: 
 
 =  ( −1 ) +1   (8)
 
with  <0 . The coefficient   captures the intensity of this relation and ac-
counts for the competitiveness of the product’s industry in this small open economy.  
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The more the industry is exposed to local and global competition, the more any addi-
tional foreign capital inflow is likely to be related to a downward shift in the supply 
curve. Marginal cost reduction could be due to the birth of new firms, to lower mar-
ket power of previous existing companies, to lower power of trade unions. More 
competition, thus, leads to a lower final output price. 
The cost of long term finance is a growing function of the total amount. To 
keep the analysis as simple as possible, we model this cost as an exponential func-
tion: 
 
 ( ) =       ,  (9)
 
where   is a scale parameter and the coefficient   accounts for the cost that the 
firm has to pay to increase long term finance.   takes positive values and is expected 
to be lower in more globalised emerging economies with a more developed financial 
market. 
The firm enters time 1 with the given stock of capital   and with available 
short term finance    and chooses investment   (and thereby the amount of long term 
finance  ) to maximise net expected profits (assuming discount rate equal to 1 for 
simplicity):  
 
 =    ( , ) − −      −  ( ).  (10)
 
At time 1,    is given, 
  
   =1 , hence the first order condition for this problem 
is: 
 
     =1+   ,  (11)
 
where     and    are the first derivatives of (1) and (9), respectively, with re-
spect to   and  . 
The Central Bank acts in the general interest of the economy and chooses op-
timal ℎ by maximising the expected profit of the firm, subject to available informa-
tion at time 0, when the future foreign capital inflow is still uncertain:  
 
max
 
      ( ,ℎ) .  (12)
 
Based on the result of Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. 
Stein (1993), the non-closed form solution to (12) is given by the following formula: 
 
ℎ∗ =1+
 
  
    
−      
      −    
 
     −        
      −    
 
,  (13)
 
where      and     are second derivatives of (1) and (9). 
The informational content of the formula for the optimal solution (13) does 
not allow one to derive easily evident implications on the relationship between pa-
rameters involved in the reserve policy decision. Expression (13) shows clearly that 
the reserve policy depends on the parameter  , capturing the relation between return 
on investment and foreign capital fluctuations. The closer to zero   is, the lower the 
reserves to short term foreign debt ratio, ℎ, which is equal to 1 (the value of the  
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Greenspan-Guidotti rule) when there is no relation between capital inflow and return 
on investment. Clearly, the decision on reserves is also dependent on the second 
moment of the shock to capital inflow ( ), which is included in the second deriva-
tives      and    . However, (13) does not show exactly how the volatility of the 
shock ( ), the competitiveness parameter ( ) and the short term foreign credit avail-
able at the date when the decision on reserves is taken (  ) affect the decision on 
optimal reserves. Moreover, as reserves in this model are a tool to coordinate financ-
ing and investing policy, more information would also be desirable on how reserves 
depend on the parameters affecting investment and cost function (and the concavity 
of the payoff function), as well as on how investment, short term and long term fi-
nance are in turn affected by reserve policy. The next subsection makes this issue 
clearer. 
 
2.2 Locally Approximated Solution 
 
Equations (3), (11) and (13) constitute an unsolved system of three equations with 
three unknowns:  ,  , ℎ. Solving this system of equations would lead to expressing 
the three unknowns as functions of the random variable,  . The system can be solved 
as a local approximation, after a second order Taylor expansion of the investment 
and equity cost functions, (1) and (9) respectively, around the expected levels of the 
investment,   , and equity,    . 
After the second order Taylor expansion, the expected revenue and cost func-
tions defined above take the following quadratic forms: 
 
 ( ) =
 
2
   +   + ,   (14)
 
with   =    (  )<0 ,   =   (  )−      (  )>0  and  =  (    )−     (  )+
 
        (  ), where     =   +  ,      =  ;  
 
 ( ) =
 
2
   +   + ,   (15)
 
with   =    (   )>0 ,   =   (   )−      (   )>0  and  =  (    )−
     (   )+
 
        (   ), where    = +     and     =  . 
Substituting (14) and (15) into the expected profit function (10), time 1’s f.o.c. 
simplifies to 
 
 (   +  ) =1+ +    .   (16)
 
Combining (16) with time 1’s budget constraint (from (3) and (7)), 
 
 = +   [ℎ+(1−ℎ ) −(1+ )], 
 
we can derive the optimal investment and long term finance as functions of the 
shock to capital inflow,  , and the optimal reserves to debt ratio, ℎ: 
 
 ∗(ℎ, ) =
(1+ ) −   −    [ℎ+(1−ℎ ) −(1+ )]
(   −  )
  (17)
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 ∗(ℎ, ) =
(1+ ) −   −      [ℎ+(1−ℎ ) −(1+ )]
(   −  )
.  (18)
 
From a second order Taylor expansion of the two expected terms of equation 
(13) around  =1 , after substituting for the approximated functions’ derivatives,    , 
    , and    , and for the optimal investment (equation (17)) into the expression for 
   , one can derive the reserves to short term foreign debt ratio: 
 
ℎ∗ =1+
 
  
[1 +   −   
  +     ][(  −  )  +3        ]
(  −  )[(  −  )  +3         ]
. 
(19)
 
Expression (19), unlike expression (13), displays the exact relationships be-
tween the parameters involved in the determination of the optimal ratio. Substituting 
expression (19) into equations (17) and (18) yields the analytical solutions for in-
vestment and long term finance levels as functions of the shock to capital inflow,  . 
 
3. Implications of the Model 
 
With the approximated analytical solution it is possible to derive, firstly, some 
propositions about the determinants of the optimal ratio of reserves to short term for-
eign debt, secondly, the effects of reserves accumulation on the firm’s investment 
and finance decisions and, thirdly, the effects on all variables of some changes in the 
parameters accounting for openness to global markets. To implement this sensitivity 
analysis, numerical simulations of the theoretical model are carried out to mimic ob-
served average data reported in Table 1. These should not be interpreted as a tenta-
tive empirical confirmation of the model’s propositions, but as exercises to identify 
and quantify the relationship between variables involved in the partial equilibrium 
framework adopted.  
Figures throughout this section refer to the full sample’s weighted average 
values only, whereas Table 4 in subsection 3.3 also refers to weighted average values 
of the subsamples (BRIC and smaller countries). In calibrating the model, we take as 
given time 0 data, i.e. the values of the fixed investment (  =   /   ) and short 
term foreign debt (   =      /       ), and we infer the values of the parameters  ,   
and   compatible with observed long period (2 years) growth, reserves to GDP ratio 
and proxy for long term finance. We assume that the elasticity and scale parameters 
of the investment function are fixed and take standard values, although the factors 
involved ( , ) are not defined in a standard way. The fixed capital share (   in Ta-
ble 1) is, thus,   = 0.25 and the variable investment’s share is   = 0.75. The value 
of the interest rate on foreign short term debt ( ) is computed from the data available 
by averaging the interest payment divided by the stock of short term foreign debt; it 
is set equal to 5% in 1990-99 and to 4% in 2000-09. The cost of long term finance 
function, by contrast, is inferred from simulations, as there are no data available and 
the heterogeneity of the sources involved in the aggregate proxy for long term fi-
nance does not allow the cost to be measured convincingly. The scale parameter mul-
tiplying the cost of long term finance function (  = 0373) is set constant throughout 
all numerical simulations, in order to focus on marginal cost changes only (δ). This  
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setting is consistent with values of the average cost of long term finance (presented in 
Table 4) which are higher than the short term interest rate and vary from a maximum 
of nearly 18% (BRIC countries in 1990-99) to a minimum of nearly 6% (smaller 
countries in 2000-09). The parameter multiplying the investment function ( ), ac-
counting for total factor productivity, is allowed to change to derive the residual part 
of long period average growth which is not attained by modifying the model’s struc-
tural parameters associated to globalisation.
  
 
3.1 Optimal Reserves to Short Term Foreign Debt 
 
This subsection derives and discusses some properties of the optimal reserves to 
short term foreign debt ratio implied by the approximated analytical solution (proofs 
of the propositions are in the appendix). 
Proposition 1 The optimal reserves to short term foreign debt ratio, ℎ∗, is a 
decreasing function of the parameter   for any    lower than the critical value 
 ∗  =
 (   ) 
      .  
This proposition confirms the general result (equation (13)) that the higher the 
correlation between return on investment and foreign capital inflow, the lower the 
optimal ratio ℎ∗, but it also adds a limit: if the volatility of the foreign capital inflow 
is too high, no clear monotonic relation can be computed in the locally approximated 
solution between ratio ℎ∗ and competitiveness parameter  . The maximum critical 
value of the variance,  ∗ , depends on the concavity of the profit function, expressed 
by the parameters   and  , and on the absolute value of the competitiveness parame-
ter,  . With the very small values of the competitiveness parameter examined in this 
section, the upper bound volatility is virtually infinite, thus the decreasing relation is 
always verified. 
Figure 7 illustrates the aforementioned relation for our sample, based on 1990-
99 (dashed line) and on 2000-09 data (continuous line). The higher sensitivity of the 
optimal ratio for the 2000-09 period depends mainly on the lower value assigned to 
the marginal cost of the long term finance (i.e. lower  , which affects the values of   
and   in the approximated solution (19)) to be consistent with the average value of 
the long period growth (see subsection 3.3 and Tables 3 and 4 for a more detailed 
explanation). In both lines, the closer to zero the value of   is, the closer the optimal 
ratio ℎ∗ is to the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. When the relation between return on in-
vestment and foreign short term debt is negative, the policy of offsetting outflows of 
short term foreign credit with newly generated domestic credit (by selling reserves) is 
not sufficient, as the investment needs to raise more finance. Ratios higher than one, 
therefore, are needed to prevent the firm from raising an extra amount of longer term 
finance. Generally speaking, the firm maximising its expected profit from a concave 
profit function is not concerned with hedging against the short term finance fluctua-
tions, but it is rather concerned with hedging against the risk of raising long term 
finance in connection with its investment opportunity. 
 
 
  
217  Foreign Reserves as Hedging Instruments in Emerging Countries 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 2, Special Issue, pp. 203-230
 
 
Source: Author’s simulation based on weighted average values reported in Table 1. 
 
Figure 7 h* as function of η 
 
h* as function of σ
 
 
h* as function of η
 
 
 
 
Source: Autor’s simulation based on weighted average values of the sample during years 2000-09 reported in Table 1 
(δ=0.2415, D0=4.57, K=16.39). 
  
Figure 8 Irrelevance of the Variance (σ) 
 
Proposition 2 Provided that    <  ∗ , given any  <0 , the higher the vari-
ance of the shock to short term foreign debt,   , the higher the reserves to short term 
foreign debt ratio, ℎ∗. 
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 8, where ℎ∗ is expressed either as a 
function of the volatility parameter,  , setting three different levels of   (-0.01, -0.07, 
-0.13), or as a function of the competitiveness parameter,  , setting three different 
values of   (0.5, 1.25, 2). Clearly, the closer the value of   is to zero, the lower the 
sensitivity of ℎ∗ is to rising volatility. As the values of   considered in the context of 
the emerging economies are very low, a change in volatility has a negligible impact 
on the choice of reserves, variable investment, and long term finance.  
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The irrelevance of the variance is not an intuitive result: more volatile short 
term foreign capital inflows have generated worries and justified raising reserves 
with a precautionary motive. However, according to this model, in line with Radelet 
and Sachs (1998) and Rodrik (2006), the fact that foreign short term capital is vola-
tile justifies the one-to-one ratio suggested by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule only, but 
does not explain rationally the higher ratios observed in recent years. 
Proposition 3 For any  <0 , the optimal ratio ℎ∗ is a decreasing function of 
the short term foreign debt,   .  
This is another counterintuitive result: common wisdom (and the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule) associates more foreign debt to more reserves. Evidence reported in 
Section 1, however, suggests that this link is not confirmed and that reserves grow 
independently from short term foreign debt. Proposition 3 allows us to explain the 
aforementioned evidence: the simple presence of short term foreign debt in a country 
justifies an equal quantity of reserves, but not more. This model, by contrast, deals 
with situations where countries hold higher ratios as they need to hedge against long 
term costly finance. When short term finance rises, the gap between investment and 
long term finance becomes lower, as does the marginal cost of long term finance. 
Hence, the incentive to substitute extra short term finance with extra long term fi-
nance is lower and the reserves to short term foreign debt ratio approaches the level 
recommended by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. 
Figure 9 illustrates this relationship by simulating optimal solutions of the 
model for different values of   , ceteris paribus. The figure reports single point solu-
tions for ℎ∗, as for every value of    all parameters of the local approximated ana-
lytical solution around the expected investment (  ) and long term finance (   ) are re-
calculated. 
 
 
Source: Author’s simulations based on weighted average values of the sample during years 2000-09 reported in Table 1 
(η=-0.065; σ=0.8; δ=0.2415, K=16.39). 
  
Figure 9  h* as Function of D0 
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3.2 Effects of the Shock to Short Term Foreign Debt 
 
Based on the optimal ratio (19), this subsection discusses the model’s implications 
about the effect of a shock to short term foreign debt on optimal decisions about in-
vestment (17) and long term finance (18), as well as on the short term finance avail-
able to the firm (7). 
Figure 10 illustrates two examples taken from weighted average values of the 
emerging countries in the two decades examined in Section 1. The values expected at 
time zero (i.e. the points corresponding to  =1 ) are also reported in Table 4, Panel 
A, first and last columns. The figure illustrates how reserve policy coordinates in-
vestment, short term and long term finance. 
 
Years 1990-99 
 
 
Years 2000-09 
 
 
Source: Author’s simulations based on weighted average values of the sample reported in Table 1. 
 
Figure 10  Investment, Short Term Finance and Long Term Finance as Functions of the Shock to 
Capital Inflow (Optimal Solutions) 
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Long term finance 
 
 
 
Investment  Short term finance 
 
 
Source: Author’s simulations based on weighted average values of the sample during years 2000-09 reported in Table 1. 
 
Figure 11   Investment, Short Term Finance and Long Term Finance with Different Reserve Ratios 
 
As the return on investment is negatively related to the shock to foreign capital 
inflow ( <0 ), the variable investment decreases with  . The short term finance at 
time 1 is also a decreasing function of the shock  , for reserves to short term ratios 
higher than one. More exactly, the higher ℎ is, the higher the slope of the short term 
finance function is (it would be a flat line for ℎ=1  recommended by the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule). The optimal ratio, therefore, makes it possible to generate short term 
finance when the foreign capital inflow slows down ( <1 ) and more investment is 
needed, and to reduce it when capital inflow increases ( >1 ) and investment slows 
down. The result of the optimal ratio is to fully stabilise (to a virtually flat line) the 
long term finance function around its expected level. The different levels of the ex-
pected variable investment (and therefore long term finance) at time 1 in the years 
1990-99 and 2000-09 are due to changes in the cost of long term finance, as we will 
see in the next subsection. A lower cost of external finance is an incentive to increase 
the variable investment, given the fixed (start up) capital factor and the expected for-
eign capital inflow.  
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Figure 11 compares firm’s investment, short term and long term finance in the 
period 2000-09, with three alternative values of the reserves to short term foreign 
debt ratio, ℎ. The Greenspan-Guidotti rule (ℎ=1 ) implies full stabilisation of short 
term finance available to the firm, lower variability of the investment but much 
higher variability of the more expensive long term finance. The ratio of reserves to 
short term foreign debt that was optimal in the 1990-99 period (ℎ = 1.484) would 
still imply a considerable variability of the long term finance in the 2000-09 period. 
By contrast, the optimal ratio in 2000-09 (ℎ∗ = 4.516), based on changed values of 
the parameters of industry (lower  ) and the financial market (lower  ), generates 
higher fluctuations in the short term finance, higher sensitivity of the investment to 
foreign capital inflow, but nearly full stabilisation of the long term finance function. 
This result confirms, again, that the purpose of reserve policy is to stabilise not short 
term finance, but the longer term finance available to the investment. The Greenspan-
Guidotti rule is not an optimal solution because it simply stabilises short term fi-
nance. 
 
3.3 Effects of Globalisation 
 
This subsection reports numerical simulations of the model presented in Section 2 
with two objectives. The first one (Table 3, Figure 12) is to analyse how sensitive the 
solutions of the model are to the parameters associated to globalisation, namely,   
and  . The second one (Table 4) is to separate and isolate the effect of three determi-
nants of GDP growth implied by the theoretical model: the change in the stock of 
fixed capital, the decreasing cost of long term finance and the increasing total factor 
productivity. 
The simulations quantify the empirical implications of the theoretical model 
when the given variables take the value of the sample examined in Section 1 of this 
study. The solution of the model depends on three parameters whose changing value 
can be associated to the process of globalisation. They account for the marginal cost 
of long term finance,  , the competitiveness of the domestic industry,  , and the 
volatility of the foreign short term capital,  . As the volatility parameter is irrelevant 
for values of   that are sufficiently low (from proposition 2), this subsection exam-
ines the effects of changing values of   and  . The purpose of the simulations is sim-
ply to focus on the role played by the structural parameters   and  , within the partial 
equilibrium framework built in this work, to determine the stylised facts observed in 
Section 1. The numerical exercises should not be considered as appropriate estimates 
of the values of the two mentioned parameters: this could be the object of further 
work. 
Table 3 refers to the full sample and computes solutions for the values of   
from -0.01 to -0.13 and   from 0.2 to 0.42. Each solution implies values for time 0’s 
optimal reserves to short term foreign debt ratio and for time 1’s expected variable 
investment, total investment, long term finance, average cost of long term finance, 
long period (2 years) growth. Bold characters are values of the 2 years growth, the 
long term finance proxy and the optimal ratio ℎ∗ compatible with those observed in 
our sample (Table 1).  
222  Marcello Spanò 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 2, Special Issue, pp. 203-230 
Table 3 illustrates the fact that lower values of   are not consistent, alone, with 
the observed increased ratios of reserves to short term foreign debt ratios, ℎ∗. In prin-
ciple, lowering the cost of long term finance should even induce a reduction in the 
stock of reserves, as it reduces the incentive to substitute extra short term finance 
with extra long term finance. Reserves, however, rise, because a lower value of   
also boosts the expected level of variable investment, which in turn requires a higher 
expected level of long term finance. The average ratio ℎ∗ for the full sample was 
1.478 in 1990-99, which corresponds to δ between 0.34 and 0.36 and   between -
0.01 and -0.02 in panel A. Panel B presents results with parameterisation of the same 
sample in the 2000-09 decade (see also Table 4). It can be verified that a level of   
equal to that inferred in Panel A would imply a small rise in ratio h*. On the other 
hand, decreasing levels of δ from 0.36 to 0.24 holding   constant, albeit able to 
mimic the observed growth and long term finance, would imply a ratio h* increasing 
to a value between 1.515 and 2.073 only. The observed value, however, is 4.516 and 
is consistent with   between -0.06 and -0.07. 
 
Table 3   Optimal Solutions for Different Values of Parameters 
 
Panel A Full Sample - Weighted Average - Years 1990-99 
RES to STD: 
h*   
η    δ      0.2  0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28  0.3  0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38  0.4  0.42 0.44 
-0.01  1.38 1.36 1.35 1.34 1.33 1.31 1.30 1.29  1.27  1.26 1.25 1.24 1.23 
-0.02  1.75 1.73 1.70 1.68 1.65 1.63 1.60 1.57  1.55  1.52 1.50 1.48 1.45 
-0.03  2.13 2.09 2.06 2.02 1.98 1.94 1.90 1.86 1.82 1.79 1.75 1.71 1.68 
-0.04  2.51 2.46 2.41 2.36 2.31 2.25 2.20 2.15 2.10 2.05 2.00 1.95 1.91 
-0.05  2.89 2.83 2.76 2.70 2.63 2.57 2.50 2.44 2.37 2.31 2.25 2.19 2.14 
-0.06  3.27 3.19 3.12 3.04 2.96 2.88 2.81 2.73 2.65 2.58 2.50 2.43 2.36 
-0.07  3.65 3.57 3.48 3.39 3.29 3.20 3.11 3.02 2.93 2.84 2.76 2.67 2.59 
-0.08  4.04 3.94 3.84 3.73 3.63 3.52 3.42 3.31 3.21 3.11 3.01 2.92 2.82 
-0.09  4.43 4.31 4.20 4.08 3.96 3.84 3.72 3.61 3.49 3.38 3.27 3.16 3.06 
-0.1  4.82 4.69 4.56 4.43 4.30 4.17 4.03 3.90 3.77 3.65 3.52 3.41 3.29 
-0.11  5.21 5.07 4.93 4.78 4.64 4.49 4.35 4.20 4.06 3.92 3.78 3.65 3.52 
-0.12  5.61 5.45 5.30 5.14 4.98 4.82 4.66 4.50 4.35 4.19 4.05 3.90 3.76 
-0.13  6.01 5.84 5.67 5.50 5.33 5.15 4.98 4.81 4.64 4.47 4.31 4.15 4.00 
 
TI  66.9 65.2 63.4 61.5 59.7 57.9 56.0 54.2 52.4 50.7 48.9 47.3 45.7 
N I   1 3 . 6 0              
S T D   5 . 6 7               
VI  53.4 51.6 49.8 48.0 46.2 44.3 42.5 40.7 38.9 37.1 35.4 33.7 32.1 
LTF  53.6 51.9 50.1 48.3 46.4 44.6 42.8 40.9  39.1  37.4 35.7 34.0 32.4 
I S T D   - 0 . 2 8              
ACLTF  0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 
GDP  g  11.3 11.1 10.9 10.6 10.4 10.1 9.83 9.52 9.20 8.85 8.49 8.11 7.72 
 
Panel B Full Sample - Weighted Average - Years 2000-09 
RES to STD: 
h*   
η    δ      0.2  0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28  0.3  0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38  0.4  0.42 0.44 
-0.01  1.58 1.56 1.54 1.51 1.49 1.47 1.45 1.43 1.41 1.39 1.37 1.35 1.33 
-0.02  2.16 2.11 2.07 2.03 1.99 1.94 1.90 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.70 1.67 
-0.03  2.73 2.67 2.61 2.55 2.48 2.42 2.35 2.29 2.23 2.17 2.11 2.05 2.00 
-0.04  3.32 3.23 3.15 3.06 2.98 2.89 2.81 2.72 2.64 2.56 2.48 2.41 2.33 
-0.05  3.90 3.79 3.69 3.58 3.48 3.37 3.26 3.16 3.05 2.95 2.85 2.76 2.67 
-0.06  4.48 4.36 4.23  4.10  3.97 3.85 3.72 3.59 3.47 3.34 3.23 3.11 3.00 
-0.07  5.07 4.93 4.78  4.63  4.48 4.33 4.18 4.03 3.88 3.74 3.60 3.47 3.34 
-0.08  5.66 5.49 5.33 5.15 4.98 4.81 4.64 4.47 4.30 4.14 3.98 3.83 3.68 
-0.09  6.26 6.07 5.88 5.68 5.49 5.29 5.10 4.91 4.72 4.54 4.36 4.19 4.02  
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-0.1  6.85 6.65 6.43 6.22 6.00 5.78 5.56 5.35 5.14 4.94 4.74 4.55 4.36 
-0.11  7.46 7.23 6.99 6.75 6.51 6.27 6.03 5.80 5.57 5.34 5.12 4.91 4.71 
-0.12  8.07 7.81 7.56 7.30 7.03 6.77 6.51 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.51 5.28 5.05 
-0.13  8.68 8.41 8.13 7.84 7.56 7.27 6.98 6.70 6.43 6.16 5.90 5.65 5.40 
 
TI  82.4 80.0 77.6 75.2 72.8 70.3 67.9 65.5 63.1 60.8 58.6 56.5 54.4 
N I   1 6 . 3 9              
S T D   4 . 5 7               
VI  66.0 63.6 61.3 58.8 56.4 53.9 51.5 49.1 46.8 44.5 42.2 40.1 38.0 
LTF 66.2  63.8  61.4  59.0  56.6 54.1 51.7 49.3 46.9 44.6 42.4 40.3 38.2 
I S T D   - 0 . 1 8              
ACLTF  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 
GDP g  14.7  14.5  14.2  13.9  13.5 13.1 12.7 12.3 11.8 11.4 10.9 10.3 9.79 
 
Note: Numerical simulation of the solution of the model when the cost of external finance rises (δ from 0.20 to 0.44) and 
when the correlation between return on investment and short term foreign capital inflow rises (η from -0.01 to -0.13). Values 
of the short term foreign debt (STD) and the net (start up) investment (NI) are equal to average values reported in Table 1. 
Interest on short term foreign debt (ISTD), based on World Bank data set, is equal to average values of interest payment 
divided by the stock of short term foreign debt. Panels A and B report numerical results for the full sample in two different 
time periods (1990-99 and 2000-09). Panels report solutions for optimal ratios of reserves to short term foreign debt ratio 
(h*) and for the expected values of the following variables: variable investment (VI), total investment (TI), long term finance 
(LTF), average cost of long term finance (ACLTF), 2 years GDP growth (GDP g). Other parameters of the model are set as 
follows: short term foreign debt volatility, σ=0.8; scale parameter of long term finance cost function, s=0.0373; share of fixed 
capital (NI), α=0.25, and of other factors (VI), β=0.75; total factor productivity, ω=2.0628 in Panel A, ω=2.0842 in Panel B. 
 
Source: Author’s simulations. 
 
According to the numerical simulations, thus, the model implies that the in-
creasing level of reserves to short term foreign debt ratios is associated to the increas-
ing competitiveness of domestic industry, which implies a negative relation (al-
though weak) between capital inflow and output price. The higher (in absolute value) 
this relation is, the higher the extent of the unpredictable fluctuations of the most ex-
pensive sources of finance associated to net foreign capital inflow, thus the higher is 
the stock of reserves needed to stabilise expensive finance around its expected level. 
While affecting unexpected fluctuations of the examined variables, competitiveness 
of domestic industry does not affect expected levels, which are only determined by  , 
as Table 3 clearly shows. 
The determination of the value of ℎ∗ as a function of the two parameters   and 
  is synthesised in Figure 12, taking data from the 2000-09 full sample’s simulated 
solutions (panel B of Table 3). It can be observed that the optimal ratio ℎ∗ is a de-
creasing function of the marginal cost of long term finance,  , and an increasing 
function of the competitiveness of the domestic industry (decreasing function of  ), 
and that its sensitiveness on the level of   is lower when   is closer to zero.  
While Table 3 focuses on the functional link between the two parameters   
and  , Table 4 isolates the effect of different determinants of GDP growth. The val-
ues of the model’s parameters are set to mimic precisely the observed changes in the 
GDP growth, the foreign reserves and the long term finance. This numerical exercise 
makes it is possible to extrapolate the values that, according to the model, the unob-
servable changes in the cost of long term finance and the total investment should 
take. Moreover, Table 4 makes it possible to separate and quantify the effects of 
three components on all changes occurring across the two decades. The first column 
associated to period 2000-09 simulates how the variables change as a simple effect of 
the observed change in the net investment (NI), the stock of short term foreign debt  
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(STD), and the slightly decreased level of the short term interest rate (r); the second 
column adds the effect of decreasing marginal cost of long term finance (δ); the third 
column adds the change in total factor productivity which is necessary, ceteris pari-
bus, to reach the observed value of the GDP growth and long term finance. 
 
 
Source: Author's simulation based on weighted sample average values during years 2000-09- Table 3, Panel B. 
 
 
Figure 12 Optimal Reserves to Short Term Debt Ratio  
 
The presented results emphasise that, according to the model, the lower cost of 
long term finance plays a very important role in the mechanism through which, in the 
last decade, BRIC economies have managed to almost double their average growth 
rates with little increase in new capital assets and short term foreign debt, and smaller 
economies have managed to increase growth despite a lower level of investment in 
new capital assets and a lower short term foreign debt. The value of   compatible 
with the observed growth rates goes from 0.356 to 0.2415 in the weighted average 
sample (panel A), from 0.4505 to 0.3041 in the BRIC subsample (panel B), from 
0.1915 to 0.122 in the smaller countries subsample (panel C). This change implies 
that the average cost of long term finance declines, in all countries, from nearly 14% 
to 10% while the quantity of long term finance increases from 39.5% to 61.25% of 
GDP. Comparing the two subsamples, the model’s simulations underline that the 
declining average cost is a common trend in both subsamples but is sharper in the 
BRIC group (from 18.3% to 13.2%) than in the smaller countries group (from 7.8% 
to 6.1%). This is associated to almost a double quantity of long term finance in the 
BRIC economies (+87.13%) and a more modest change (+8.55%) in the smaller 
economies. Adding the net start up investment (given by data) and the variable in-
vestment (found as optimal solution) yields the total investment, which increases in 
all numerical simulations (+72% in BRIC and +5.8% in smaller economies, +46.6% 
on average).  
Finally, to isolate the pure effect of the lower cost of long term finance, we 
compare the first and the second columns associated to the 2000-09 period. This cost 
effect determines 2.09 points of GDP growth in the full sample (whereas 1.6 points 
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are due to the increased investment in new fixed assets and 1.21 points to changes in 
total factor productivity). In other words, the model generates almost half (42.7%) of 
the observed rise in GDP growth as a pure effect of the decreasing cost of long term 
finance. This pure cost effect determines more than half of GDP growth for the BRIC 
sample (63.11%) and one third for the smaller countries group (33.33%). The total 
factor productivity effect, in the third column, captures the residual growth that the 
model is not able to reproduce. 
The simulations reported in Table 4 provide quantitative advice about this 
model’s implications on the driving forces behind the emerging countries’ observed 
growth rates. Clearly, an appropriate estimate of the impact of the cost of long term 
finance on economic growth should be carried out by jointly considering the effect of 
variables that in the theoretical model are assumed to be constant (see Section 2), 
which is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
Table 4   Observed Variables as Optimal Solutions 
 
Panel A Full Sample - Weighted Average 
 
All countries  1990-99 2000-09
STD to GDP 5.67 4.57
NI to GDP 13.60 16.39
η -0.017 -0.065
δ 0.356 0.356 0.2415
s 0.0373 0.0373
ω 2.0628 2.0628 2.0842
r 0.05 0.04
RES to GDP  8.41 16.58 20.05 20.64
RES to STD (h*)  1.484 3.628 4.387 4.516
2y GDP growth  9.26 10.86 12.95 14.15
Δ growth  +1.60 +2.09 +1.21
LTF/GDP 39.5 45.85 59.02 61.25
AC of LTF  0.138 0.146 0.100 0.101
TI/GDP 52.82 62.06 75.22 77.46
 
Panel B BRIC Economies - Weighted Average  
 
All countries  1990-99 2000-09
STD to GDP 3.09 4.07
NI to GDP 14.11 19.22
η -0.028 -0.078
δ 0.4505 0.4505 0.3041
s 0.0373 0.0373
ω 2.1015 2.1015 2.1086
r 0.05 0.04
RES to GDP  6.87 17.35 23.81 24.04
RES to STD (h*)  2.226 4.268 5.857 5.912
2y GDP growth  9.23 11.50 16.17 16.63
Δ growth  +2.27 +4.67 +0.46
LTF/GDP 34.12 42.57 63.12 63.84
AC of LTF  0.183 0.202 0.132 0.132
TI/GDP 48.07 61.63 82.18 82.90
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Panel C Smaller Emerging Economies - Weighted Average 
 
All countries  1990-99 2000-09
STD to GDP 8.81 5.26
NI to GDP 12.99 12.16
η -0.007 -0.044
δ 0.1915 0.1915 0.122
s 0.0373 0.0373
ω 2.024 2.024 2.0537
r 0.05 0.04
RES to GDP  10.23 13.32 14.10 14.62
RES to STD (h*)  1.161 2.533 2.682 2.779
2y GDP growth  9.10 8.54 8.89 10.15
Δ growth    -0.56 +0.35 +1.26
LTF/GDP 48.68 45.56 49.94 52.84
AC of LTF  0.078 0.078 0.060 0.061
TI/GDP 61.23 57.51 61.89 64.79
 
Note: Numerical simulation of the solution of the model given the values of the short term foreign debt (STD) and the net 
(start up) investment (NI). The parameters account for: correlation between return on investment and short term foreign 
capital inflow, η; marginal cost of long term finance, δ; scale parameter of long term finance cost function, s; total factor 
productivity, ω; interest rate on short term foreign debt, r (calculated from World Bank data set and equal to average values 
of interest payment divided by the stock of short term foreign debt). Panels report solutions for foreign reserves to GDP 
(RES to GDP), ratios of reserves to short term foreign debt ratio (RES to STD), and for the expected values of the following 
variables: 2 years GDP growth (2y GDP growth), change in growth (Δ growth), measured as the difference between the 
value of 2y GDP growth reported in one column and that reported in the column on the left; long term finance (LTF), aver-
age cost of long term finance (AC on LTF), total investment (TI). Other parameters of the model are set as follows: short 
term foreign debt volatility, σ=0.8; share of fixed capital (NI), α=0.25, and of other factors (VI), β=0.75.  
 
Source: Author’s simulations. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Traditional models explaining stockpiles of foreign reserves describe emerging coun-
tries as financing long term investment with volatile short term foreign capital and 
building reserves to cushion the real output of the economy in the event of foreign 
capital outflow. Foreign reserves, in that they channel domestic saving away from 
financing domestic investment, are often seen as causing high social costs or under-
investment in the emerging economies (Rodrik 2006; Greenwald and Stiglitz 2010). 
However, in the last decade, emerging economies kept short term foreign debt and 
investment in net fixed capital nearly unchanged (or even reduced them), but in-
creased reserves disproportionately and simultaneously managed to increase GDP 
growth. This work has constructed a model that is able to derive both the high GDP 
growth and the growing stock of reserves as the result of the same process of the 
globalisation of the emerging economies. 
The model derives the reserves to short term foreign debt ratio as an optimal 
choice of a Central Bank which acts in the interest of a representative firm. It builds 
on the assumption that short term finance, which depends on foreign capital inflow 
and domestic monetary policy, is volatile but cheaper, whereas long term private fi-
nance is more costly and the cost increases with quantity. A variable component of 
the investment is decided, and simultaneously long term finance is raised, once the 
available short term finance is known with certainty. The optimal solution depends 
crucially on two structural parameters newly introduced in this model and representa-
tive of the openness of the emerging countries to global markets: they account for the  
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marginal cost of long term finance and for the competitiveness of the domestic indus-
try. 
An approximated analytical solution has been derived to carry out a sensitivity 
analysis of the model. The model implies that Central Banks of the emerging coun-
tries hold foreign reserves with the purpose of stabilising not the short term but the 
long term finance available to the firm around its expected level. For this purpose, a 
one-to-one Greenspan-Guidotti rule is not sufficient: emerging economies rationally 
accumulate higher ratios of reserves to short term foreign debt. 
Numerical simulations of the model have reproduced the rising level of re-
serves in connection with rising GDP growth and rising long term finance as a result 
of two simultaneous changes in the aforementioned structural parameters: a falling 
cost of long term finance and increasing competitiveness of the domestic industry. 
Both changes could be ascribed to the higher openness of the emerging economies to 
global goods and financial markets. In particular, simulations have derived almost 
half of the observed rise in GDP growth during the decade 2000-09 as a pure effect 
of the decreasing cost of long term finance. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1 
 
The sign of the ratio as a function of   is given by the sign of the factor multiplying 
the ratio 
 
  
 of the RHS in equation (19). The expression [(  −  )  +3        ] on 
the numerator is always positive as it is a sum of squares. The expression (  −  ) in 
the denominator is always negative by the definitions of the parameters in (14) and 
(15). The expression [1 +   −
  
  +     ] in the numerator is positive for values of 
parameters  ,  ,   and   consistent with the elasticity of the product to the variable 
investment calculated in   ,    =
        
 
          . This can be seen by taking the expectations 
at time 0 of the optimal investment level from equation (17): the expected level of 
investment is     =
(   )       
(   ) ; the expression [1 +   −
  
  +     ] is hence posi-
tive if    (  −  ) −   < −
  
 , i.e.     <−
 
  =   . This upper bound condition to the 
expected investment is not binding for values of the parameters consistent with a 
positive elasticity of the product to the investment: substituting    =    into the expres-
sion for   , it turns out that    =0 . Hence, the ratio that multiplies the parameter   is 
negative whenever the expression ((  −  )  +3         ) in the denominator is posi-
tive, i.e. whenever    <  ∗  =
 (   ) 
      . 
 
 
Proposition 2 
 
Everything else being constant, a higher variance,   , increases the value of the nu-
merator of expression (19), as 3       >0 , while decreasing the value of the de-
nominator, as 3       <0  . Hence, for any value of  <0 , the higher the variance, 
  , the higher the value of ℎ∗. 
 
 
Proposition 3 
From equation (19) the factors containing    can be insulated: 
[    
  
       ]
  
=
     
  
   
  
+    . This expression is positive (see proof of Proposition 1) and is lower as 
   is higher. Hence, the value of ℎ∗ is closer to 1 as    is higher, for any value of  . 
 